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INTRODUCTION
It may be the problem is the presence of too many aca-
demics, whose intellectual interest in the policy issues far ex-
ceeds their understanding of the needs of a successful policy-
making process.1
Choice of law today, both the theory and practice of it, is univer-
sally said to be a disaster.2 The agreement on that proposition, among
all branches of the profession, is nearly universal. Scholars trash every
judicial effort, propound theories by the score to resolve the confused
situation, and then criticize other scholars or judges who choose to
follow false gods; even worse, perhaps, some judges are polytheistic,
following many gods.' Courts are thought routinely to engage in rank
decisionmaking with thumbs on the scale, commonly favoring plain-
tiffs (especially local ones) by applying domestic, rather than out-of-
state, rules.4 The confusion is complete. The poor lawyer who gives
advice to clients on choice-of-law matters meets with stares of
disbelief.5
* Jacob A. France Professor of Judicial Process, University of Maryland School of Law.
AB., Dartmouth College; J.D., Harvard University. My thanks to Bill Richman for reading
a draft of this Article.
1. Robert Pear, Word for Word: The Health Care Papers; Now It Can Be Told: The Task
Force Was Bold and Naive and Collegial N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at E7 (quoting Treasury
Department economist James R. Ukockis, on the President's Task Force on Health Care
Reform).
2. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REv. 731,
731-32 (1990) (pointing out the confusion surrounding modem choice-of-law analysis).
3. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 357, 382 (1992) (surveying torts decisions since 1960 and concluding
that "the new theories (of deciding conflicts questions] usually amount to little more than
long-winded excuses to do what courts wanted to do in the first place").
4. This explains the recent trend by insurance companies to seek a favorable forum
by becoming plaintiffs themselves through declaratory judgment actions. See Larry
Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 465, 476-80 (1991) (discussing the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
to obtain favorable choice-of-law decisions).
5. This also happens to the poor "expert" law professor who advises other lawyers.
Similar reactions come when one tries to explain the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Orga-
nizations (RICO) or the Robinson-Patman Acts to the uninitiated. At least Congress cre-
ated those two problems, however. The responsibility for the choice-of-law debacle lies
almost entirely with academics.
1371
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
This Article first examines how the law of choice of law arrived at
this apparently sorry state of affairs and then suggests how we might
clean up the mess.6 It begins with a brief history of choice-of-law anal-
ysis, from the learned Justice Story through both Restatements and St.
Currie and on to contemporary writers. It then examines what went
wrong-why the wheels came off the cart. Finally, it suggests an emi-
nently reasonable solution to the problem.
The diagnosis and treatment can be stated simply: The present
unhappiness over the practice of choice of law is a consequence, in
very large part, of treating choice-of-law questions differently than or-
dinary questions that common law judges are asked to resolve. The
wooden, poorly thought-out choice-of-law opinions that are all too fre-
quent today result from judges straying from their common law roots.
In other words, judges issue poor choice-of-law decisions because they
do not think openly in terms of reaching the proper result in the case
at bar. They do not think that way because the system encourages
them to think conceptually (of sovereigns and governmental interests,
for example), rather than in terms of policy analysis and application
of individual facts-those very factors that they would consider para-
mount in more ordinary cases.
Expressed somewhat differently, choice of law is marked today by
intense theorizing and academic overload. That has happened be-
cause judicial input into its development has been weak, leading to an
undue occupation of the field by academic writers. The resulting
over-conceptualization of choice-of-law questions has made this an ex-
traordinarily difficult field for a novice-like the ordinaryjudge. The
novice, naturally impressed by all of this confusion among the wise
initiates, believes that she, too, should resort to incomprehensible
concepts and other mumbo-jumbo. But it is exactly that kind of ab-
stract reasoning, not rooted in the facts of the individual case, that
betrays the courts. Judges, in other words, should stick to doing what
they are trained to do: decide cases fairly and explain why they think
the result is correct.
Another way to state the thesis of this Article is that the West Pub-
lishing Company got it right. The West "key number" system has no
separate entry for choice of law,7 nor should there be one. Choice of
6. This Article's focus is entirely on legal problems whose choice-of-law issues involve
more than one state of our glorious Union. It expressly does not address either interna-
tional choice of law or federal versus state choice of law, such as Erie questions or
preemption.
7. Instead, each substantive area has a separate key number for choice-of-law
problems. Thus, torts, key number 6, deals with choice-of-law problems in torts.
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law should not be treated as a separate intellectual and legal disci-
pline, as American courts and scholars have done for the past century
and a half. Rather, choice-of-law questions should be treated in the
same way as other ordinary questions requiring the reconciliation of
conflicting precedents or conflicting statutes. In the ordinary case in-
volving conflicting and competing rules of decision, the court first
identifies the policies that animate those laws; the court then explains
why, in light of the facts, one or the other of the policies should con-
trol; the court also explains why the other competing policies were
not winners and why arguably applicable precedents were not
followed.
This is the method that should be employed to decide cases in
which the laws of different states might reasonably be applied. Cases
involving competing laws from different jurisdictions should not be
treated differently from the model of cases involving competing laws
of the samejurisdiction. There should be no talk of vested rights, sov-
ereignty, comity, or governmental interests. At least when dealing
with the overwhelming majority of private disputes in which the laws
of more than one state might apply, there simply is no reason to devi-
ate from ordinary common law decisionmaking.8
This Article, in short, argues for the routine application of tradi-
tional common law decisionmaking techniques to choice-of-law
problems. The touchstone for analysis should be explanation of re-
sults, not a priori theory. Judge Keeton's observation that "Ij]udicial
choice, at its best, is reasoned choice, candidly explained,"9 works as
well in choice of law as elsewhere. Choice-of-law decisions do not re-
quire elaborate theoretical decisional models any more than do deci-
sions in any other common law area. Policy analysis (often called
"doctrinal analysis"), done overtly and proudly, should be the goal.
Legal process, rather than legal theory, holds the key to good decision-
making in choice of law.
The failure to do what comes naturally has had disastrous conse-
quences for American choice-of-law practice. The confusion that has
resulted from thinking about theory rather than process created the
disarray mentioned in the first paragraph of this Article. That disarray
in turn has led scholars and judges to the dubious expedient of limit-
ing discretion by self-denial and the deployment of arbitrary "rules."
8. A small percentage of cases involve true sovereign interests. An example would be
a tort action in state Xseeking to recover damages from state Y (i.e., from the state itself),
whose own law of sovereign immunity would bar recovery. This Article does not deal with
those cases.
9. ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 1 (1990).
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I. A BIEF HISTORY OF CHOICE-oF-LAw THEORY
A short discussion of choice of law in America will help explain
how theory displaced policy analysis. It begins with Justice Story's de-
cision to separate choice of law from the rest of the judicial agenda,
moves on to the siren song of certainty propounded by the first Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws,1" progresses to the domination of the field
by academic writing, and ends with the almost-universally condemned
(albeit almost-universally accepted) effort by the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws1 1 to restore choice of law to the common law world.
A. Story and Comity
Conflicts law in this country developed from Justice Story's magis-
terial treatise on the subject. 2 Story addressed fundamental ques-
tions, such as why the courts of one country should ever apply the laws
of another."8 (To a common lawyer, this was not an obvious question,
for the Royal courts always had applied English law.)' 4 Upon reflec-
tion, Story proposed two maxims: First, that every state had "exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory,"15 and second,
"that no state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property
out of its own territory, or bind persons not resident therein."' 6
These maxims led Story to conclude, not surprisingly, "that whatever
force and obligation the laws of one country have in another depend
solely upon the laws and municipal regulations of the latter."' 7 Story
seized the well-known phrase "comity of nations" to "express the true
foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation
within the territories of another."' 8 These concepts-the "sover-
10. RESTATEMENT OF CONFUCT OF LAws (1934).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUcT OF LAWS (1971).
12. SeeJOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (7th ed. 1872). The
first edition of Story's treatise was published in 1834.
13. There is a rich history to choice of law, dating back to a Ptolemaic choice-of-law
rule "preserved to posterity in the wrappings of a crocodile mummy." Hessel E. Yntema,
The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 300 (1953); see also
Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. REv. 419 (1984).
14. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 79 (5th
ed. 1956) (discussing the history of English law courts). But see id. at 300 ("Even at the
present day English courts upon occaision will refer to Roman law.., in rare cases where
the native law gives no guidance.").
15. STORY, supra note 12, § 18.
16. Id. § 20.
17. Id. § 23. These principles appear to first have been identified by Ulric Huber, a
Dutch jurist of the late seventeenth century. See Yntema, supra note 13, at 306.
18. STORY, supra note 12, § 38.
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eignty" maxim and the "comity" maxim-have shaped our view of
choice of law down to the present.
Three key points emerge from reading Story that bedevil us to-
day. One is that the choice-of-law responsibilities of the forum to-
wards other "states" and towards foreign "nations" are the same; thus,
it is possible to justify, as Story himself did, a refusal to follow the law
of another jurisdiction because doing so would be "repugnant" to
"Christian" nations.19 It is not at all clear whether Story thought
choice-of-law practice should be the same for each type of case, re-
gardless of sovereign, although he himself mixed interstate authorities
with international ones. Nonetheless, the thought that there should
be some congruence between the two types of choice of law has per-
sisted throughout our history.2" Story's second pernicious and lasting
contribution to the current choice-of-law disaster was his introduction
of comity and sovereignty into the scheme of things: that is, the idea
that a state applies another state's law only to accommodate that other
state; in other words, another state's law is chosen only as a matter of
comity (or courtesy), not obligation. Finally, and perhaps worst of
all, is the notion that, in reaching choice-of-law decisions, judges
should use techniques different from those normally employed in de-
ciding more traditional cases.22
All of these developments have had enormous and largely harm-
ful consequences. American courts and scholars today generally be-
lieve that following another state's law is an act of grace rather than
something done as a matter of routine.2' The conflation of interna-
tional and interstate choice-of-law theory has diminished (until very
recently) the development of ideas about how choice of law fits into
19. Id. § 25. Among his examples are polygamy, incest, and "despotic cruelty." Id.
One hopes that no American state approves of that trilogy today.
20. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitu-
tional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 259 (1992) ("It is a serious mis-
take to discuss domestic and international choice-of-law cases interchangeably, even
though that practice is nearly universal in the conflicts literature.").
21. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. A side effect of the emphasis on
comity has been an amazingly sterile debate on whether a state that chooses to use another
state's law is applying that state's laws ex proprio vigore, or is adopting that law as its own in
order to resolve the case. See, e.g., Elliott E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws:
Their Role and Utility, 58 -Liv. L. REv. 361 (1945) (examining major questions surrounding
the choice to use foreign law). That anyone would care about such a ridiculous question
shows the tenor of much of the choice-of-law debate.
22. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 2, at 733 ("[T]he courts borrow from all the modern
approaches, using whatever pieces of the analysis seem useful and compelling in a particu-
lar case.").
23. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICr OF
LAws 167 (2d ed. 1993).
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our federal scheme of government. Moreover, the separation of
choice of law from "normal" decisionmaking has led to artificial (and
bad) decisionmaking.
B. Beale and Vested Rights
The next big development in American choice of law was the
vested rights theory and its ensuing Reign of Terror. The arch-priest
of that theory was Professor Joseph Beale of Harvard, and its Sacred
Text was the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws,24 promulgated in 1934.
The rigidly dogmatic vested rights theory25 required the application of
the law of the jurisdiction where a right "vested." A tort right vested,
for example, in the state where the injury occurred (rather than, say,
where the wrongful conduct occurred); a contract right vested in the
state where the last act necessary to make the contract took place (usu-
ally the acceptance), and so on. The system purported to solve all
choice-of-law problems by isolating a key fact (such as where the plain-
tiff was injured); once the location of that fact is identified, the law to
be applied follows ineluctably. On the surface, at least, the judge ex-
ercises no discretion; choosing applicable law is a routine, humdrum
enterprise.
26
The vested rights theory was the perfect complement to the then-
dominant views of economic due process (which also emphasized a
form of "vestedness"), and, indeed, the Supreme Court came very
close at times to constitutionalizing the vested rights theory.27 It is a
mistake, however, to view the Bealean logic as politically based.
Rather, the First Restatement represents the apotheosis of legal formal-
ism, 2 ' as the hundreds and hundreds of rules laid down in the First
Restatement contain not a hint of any policy goals-liberal, conserva-
24. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
25. Beale did not originate the vested rights theory. It can be traced back to Dicey's
great treatise, A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND wITH REFERENCE TO THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 24-26 (1896), discussing the principle of extraterritorial recognition of
rights, and, further back, to Huber. See Yntema, supra note 13, at 308 n.29.
26. My colleague, John Brumbaugh, a scholar of jurisprudence, suggests that Beale,
who was also a prominent writer on jurisprudence, did have a policy-to establish a system
that would permit people to work together efficiently.
27. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407 (1930) (holding that Texas could
not regulate an insurance contract made in Mexico).
28. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 379, 382 (1988) ("Formalism is law without a policy-except perhaps for the policy
that the law must be internally consistent and self-contained, and must not draw its wisdom
from outside."). On legal formalism, see generally GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERI-
CAN LAw (1977) (reviewing the historical development of American law).
1376 [VOL. 56:1371
1997] LEGAL PROCESS AND CHOICE OF LAW 1377
tive, or whatever-that the rules might seek to achieve.29 The lex loci
rules, as they are known, obviously needed no policy justification-
they are because they are. As a result, the elegant, closed system laid
down by Beale could be applied without any appearance of an exer-
cise of judicial discretion, something the formalists abhorred. More-
over, the Bealean rules were apparently simple and easy to apply.
Certainty and predictability in judicial decisionmaking, the heaven of
the formalists, had been brought well within the reach of mortals.
The practice under the First Restatement, however, was quite differ-
ent. Although Bealean logic produced reasonable decisions in most
cases, often enough the result defied common sense.3 ° In other
words, judges had to decide real cases, and occasionally they did not
like the result Professor Beale had mandated in his Restatement.
Judges began to look for ways to avoid the rules in order to do justice.
The courts, in short, began to cheat.3" Judicial deceit became so com-
mon that it acquired a name; the judges, it was said, were employing
29. Yntema explained that Beale viewed the common law, from which almost all his
choice-of-law rules derived, as "'a body of scientific principle.'" Yntema, supra note 13, at
313 (quoting Joseph Beale, The Necessity for a Study of Legal System, 14 PROC. Ass'N AM. L.
SCHS. 31, 38 (1914)). Arthur Sutherland wrote that Beale
was as kindly as a man can be; at the same time he was a dialectical swordsman
who played for classroom victory. He persuaded himself that some sort of neces-
sity controlled law, that there existed a cosmic logical sequence which could be
perceived and stated if only one could think aright.
ARTHUR SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 216 (1967). The First Restatement certainly was
a heroic attempt at creating "a cosmic logical sequence."
Perhaps another anecdote better illustrates Beale's thought: "[Beale] was a master
dialectician. Among his students it was common talk that you could occasionally beat
Beale in an argument, but never if you let him state the question." A. JAMES CASNER & W.
BARTON LEACH, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 82 n.3 (2d ed. 1969).
One last story is worth preserving. A member of the Class of 1927 at Harvard once
asked Beale a question. "Beale replied: 'If you want to know what the law was, ask Profes-
sor Williston. If you want to know what the law will be, ask Professor Frankfurter. If you
want to know what the law is, sit down.'" Victor Jacobs, HARV. L. BULL. 48 (Fall 1996).
30. The examples are legion. The following is an easy illustration: Two New Yorkers
are on a train to Washington. As the train passes through Delaware, they orally agree on a
contract to be performed in New York. Assume that the oral contract is valid under New
York law, but that the Delaware statute of frauds requires a writing. The agreement cannot
be enforced because the vested rights theory would require that Delaware law-the place
where the contract was made-be applied.
31. The most prescient judges sat on the Supreme Court. In a series of cases begin-
ning with Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), the
Justices retreated from the constitutional implications of the vested rights theory. Instead,
the Court gave permission for any state with an "interest" in the problem to apply its law to
decide the case, and, as a precursor to modem choice-of-law theory, talked about the inter-
ests of the states in regulating the conduct at issue. See generally Paul A. Freund, ChiefJustice
Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1210 (1946) (discussing ChiefJustice Stone's
opinions in a series of conflict-of-laws cases).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"escape devices. '"32 A number of escape devices were available, includ-
ing characterization, substance, procedure, renvoi, depecage, and public
policy.33
The most obvious escape device was characterization. All of the
First Restatement rules turned on how one labeled a case, but as Profes-
sor Richman has noted, the document utterly fails to tell the reader
how to characterize.34 Choice of law in contract, for example, turned
on whether the issue is one of contract making (in which the court is
to apply lex locus contractus), or of contract performance (calling for
application of the law of the place of performance); we are not told,
however, how to make the choice between those two competing rules.
Is a suit for failure of warranty a problem with contract making (what
does the warranty mean) or one of performance (did the goods satisfy
the promise)? Another troublesome choice is between "substance"
and "procedure." (Forum law generally is applied to questions of pro-
cedure.) For example, is a limitations problem one of substance or of
procedure? Eventually, the judges discovered the ultimate escape de-
vice: "public policy. '35 No law would be enforced if doing so would
violate a "fundamental public policy" of the forum.3 6 That makes
good sense when dealing with the laws of Nazi Germany, of course,
but what about the laws of Connecticut?3
7
In many cases, it seemed that the court's characterization deci-
sion merely reflected a decision made for other reasons. Unfortu-
nately, Bealean logic forbade decisionmaking by reference to facts or
policy or, indeed, to anything other than the prescribed rules; thus,
real decisionmaking in cases had to be performed sub silentio through
the use of escape devices. Because the reasons had to remain un-
stated, courts embarked on a course of decisionmaking that enhanced
neither predictability nor accountability.
32. See generally RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 186-88 (explaining devices used
by the courts to avoid the situs rule).
33. See id. § 63, at 64-67.
34. See id. at 152.
35. See id. at 159.
36. See id.
37. The classic comparison is between two New York cases decided two years apart.
The first, Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1936), refused to apply the place-of-injury rule
to an accident in Connecticut involving a New York married couple who sued one another.
Id. at 600. New York recognized interspousal immunity, but Connecticut did not. Id. at
597-98. Applying Connecticut law, the court said, would violate the public policy of New
York. Id. at 599-600. The court, however, was less solicitous of New York's honor in Holzer
v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschafi, 14 N.E.2d 798 (N.Y. 1938). There, a German national
sued his former employer, a German company, for firing him because he wasJewish. Id. at
799. The defendant argued that German law mandated the firing. Id. at 800. The court
upheld the defense. Id. I defy anyone to reconcile these two cases on a principled basis.
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A major difficulty with escape devices lay in their apparently for-
tuitous application. They worked only if their deployment was not
revealed. The existence of escape devices, therefore, had to remain a
secret, thus creating a kind of stealth law. The ideal of the vested
rights theory, after all, demanded ritual obeisance to its dictates,
hence, the absence of any discussion of how to characterize a prob-
lem. Moreover, many (perhaps most) judges and lawyers did not un-
derstand this game, played without overt rules. Some judges would
not play at all; others became so enamored of their own cleverness
that they refused to use escape devices once they realized that their
goal was to circumvent the lex loci rules.3 8
Although the vested rights theory today is thoroughly discredited
by scholars,39 as indeed is legal formalism writ large,4° the First Restate-
ment left behind an imposing three-part legacy. The first part may be
more in the form of a myth, but it certainly exists. Many students of
choice of law still believe (or at least dream) that somewhere lies a set
of choice-of-law rules that can decide real cases and cannot be
manipulated by result-oriented judges.41 That myth has had an im-
mense and deleterious impact on contemporary thought about choice
of law.
The second part of the legacy of vested rights and choice of law is
one that, in its own way, has proven as troublesome as the goal of
38. See, e.g., Toledo Soc'y for Crippled Children v. Hickok, 261 S.W.2d 692, 701 (Tex.
1953) (refusing to apply "the fiction of equitable conversion" to conflict of laws); see also
DAVID VERNON ET AL., CONFLICr OF LAWs: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 265 (1990)
(stating that the Hickok court was "overwhelmed by its unmasking" of the fiction of equita-
ble conversion).
39. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 167.
40. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 12 (1977) (discussing the rejec-
tion of legal formalism in American legal thought).
41. The First Restatement, however, retains scant potency in the courts. Far fewer than
half of the states allegedly follow Professor Beale's method in all things. See William M.
Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary
of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196, 1200 (1997).
Whether they actually do so is another matter. Maryland, for example, purports still to
follow the First Restatement. See Richard W. Bourne, Modern Maryland Conflicts: Backing into
the Twentieth Century One Hauch at a Time, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 71, 73 (1993). Nevertheless,
through the use of blatant manipulation of characterization and heavy-handed "public pol-
icy" exceptions, the Maryland courts exemplify the worst of what happens when formalism
is combined with a desire to dojustice: the case law is inconsistent, and one can only guess
at the real basis for the decision. For a discussion of the Maryland cases, see id.
In addition, the First Restatement remains dominant, perhaps everywhere, in matters
involving real property. See RCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 253 (pointing out that
the law of situs "is the rule in contemporary case law"). The potency of the lex sitae rules
remains very strong, despite new universal scholarly condemnation of their use in theory
and in practice. See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS
444-45 (2d ed. 1980) (criticizing the use of the situs rule).
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certainty. The second legacy, the converse of the first, is the tradition
of scholarly trashing of judicial and academic choice-of-law efforts.
This second legacy, discussed in the next section, derives from the
assault on the Bealean citadel.
The third legacy is perhaps best described as a kind of counter-
legacy. A massive amount of case law under Beale's system confirms a
basic truth: Courts will not be bound by rules at the expense of jus-
tice; in other words, whenjustice requires, the rules will be ignored. If
the departure from the rules can neither be acknowledged nor ex-
plained, as was true with the vested rights theory, decisions are no
longer based on justice under law, but apparently on chance or other
equally arbitrary factors. The result, of course, is a mess that is neither
just nor law.
C. Currie and Interest Analysis
Even as the First Restatement was being published in 1934, the
seeds of its destruction were being sown by the legal realists.42
Although it took a long time, by the mid-1950s, profound disillusion
with the Bealean system had set in.4" Amazingly, however, it was not
until 1958 that the weapons of legal realism were brought fully to bear
on the problems of choice of law. Leading the assault was Brainerd
Currie. In a series of articles published over half a dozen years, Currie
advanced the notion, basic to realism, that all law should be func-
tional; that is, the law applied to a case should consciously advance
stated social goals:
Currie and his precursors argued that it is inherently un-
sound to choose between competing laws without reference
to the content of those laws, as the First Restatement did....
[I]n choosing between competing laws, courts should take
into account the policies behind those laws and the facts of
the particular case.4 4
By 1958, that kind of argument was hardly revolutionary to legal aca-
demics, or even to many judges. Nevertheless, Currie's writings hit
the staid conflicts world like a bombshell. There had been harbingers
of change before Currie, of course, most notably in writings by Walter
42. See Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its "New Crits, "36 AM. J. COMP.
L. 681, 682 (1988) (noting early criticisms of the First Restatement).
43. See id. at 682-83.
44. Id. at 683.
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Wheeler Cook4 5 and David Cavers.4 6 But conflicts scholars and judges
long had been held in thrall by Professor Beale's facially complete and
apparently self-contained world. Currie shattered the spell with a ven-
geance. Beale's structure has never been rebuilt, and Currie's work
now stands at the apex of the scholarly conflicts pantheon.
The profound impact of Currie's writings on conflicts law can be
traced, at least in part, to the remarkable edifice that Beale had built.
It must have been difficult being a conflicts scholar in the early post-
War era. On the one hand, the First Restatement appeared to have
solved all choice-of-law problems. On the other hand, for those un-
easy about the project, it appeared to be an impenetrable fortress,
capable of repelling all assaults.4 7 It was a structure that could not be
nibbled away; it could only be blown up. Only a nuclear strike of a
type that Currie launched could demolish the structure: Currie's real
genius lay both in seeing the need to fashion a weapon to carry out
the necessary destruction, and in being brazen enough to think that
he could pull it off. To do this he not only had to expose the silliness
of the old system (after all, others had done that), but he also had to
invent a new system. 48 He had to build as well as merely destroy. The
edifice he designed did just that. Not only did it demolish the citadel
of vested rights, but its theoretical concepts remain the basis (or at
least the starting point) of virtually all discussion today of choice of
law.
The quality of Currie's work (known today as "interest analysis")
is truly impressive. 49 Its major theoretical success lay in bringing the
lessons of legal realism to bear on choice-of-law issues, by emphasizing
that a court could not choose a rule of decision to apply unless it
examined the policy served by the law in the light of the facts of the
45. See WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1942). Cook had his own problems, however. Among them was a belief that a court
enforces not a foreign right but a right created by its own law." Id. at 315.
46. See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173
(1977) (discussing the need to consider results when deciding conflict-of-laws problems).
47. Conflicts scholarship at this time was very pedestrian. Illustrative of the state of
post-War conflicts law are the careers of Paul Freund and Erwin Griswold. Both were hired
to teach conflicts at Harvard Law School; both ended up in other, less demanding, areas
(respectively, constitutional law and federal taxation).
48. See Posnak, supra note 42, at 701 ("[Currie] utilized the principles of legal realism
to develop a functional approach to choice of law.").
49. See generally LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAws: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIREC-
TIONS ch. 2 (1991) (discussing Currie's approach to resolving conflict-of-laws questions).
Alfred Hill, a major critic of Currie, has acknowledged that the impact of interest analysis is
a feat without parallel in the history of the common law." Alfred Hill, TheJudicial Function
in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1585, 1588 (1985).
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case.5 ' This led to Currie's major practical contribution: the idea of
the "false conflict." Currie pointed out that, if the policies animating
the laws of only one jurisdiction were involved in the litigation, then
that state's law should be applied; any other result would be per-
verse." Recognition of a false conflict permits many cases to be re-
solved easily-the court applies the only law whose policy is implicated
by the problem. The merit of this obvious yet radical suggestion is
such that almost all scholars and most courts observe it today.
More problematic to Currie (and virtually everyone else) is the
proper way to resolve a "true" conflict. This problem occurs when the
policies behind the laws of at least two jurisdictions would be fur-
thered if either were to be applied to the case at hand.52 Currie found
the true conflict a difficult nut to crack.53 His difficulty arose from a
fundamental misunderstanding of our legal system:
[A] ssessment of the respective values of the competing legiti-
mate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine
which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high or-
der .... It is a function which the courts cannot perform
effectively, for they lack the necessary resources.... This is a
job for a legislative committee, and determining the policy to
be formulated on the basis of the information assembled is a
job for a competent legislative body.54
In other words, only the legislature is qualified to perform the "polit-
ical function" required to adjust competing "legitimate interests of
two sovereign states." As a result, only statutory, and not common, law
can provide the answer.
The reader who has followed this far will recognize that Currie
had been snared in Story's web. The question of judicial ability to
resolve "competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states" para-
50. See Posnak, supra note 42, at 683 (noting that "the crux of Currie's approach.., is
that in choosing between competing laws, courts should take into account the policies
behind those laws and the facts of the particular case").
51. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws Method, 25
U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1958) (demonstrating Currie's false-conflict analysis using the case of
Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878)).
52. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE
L.J. 171, 173. This article was Currie's first attempt to present a general theory of choice of
law. Unfortunately, Currie died in 1964 while his ideas were still evolving.
53. See id. at 173-76 (explaining the shortcomings of existing political and judicial at-
tempts to resolve true conflict-of-laws issues).
54. Id. at 176-77.
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lyzed Currie, as well it should.55 Phrased this particular way, the issue
does present a high-level political question of the type that we nor-
mally expect legislatures rather than courts to solve. The issue, how-
ever, could be framed differently and thereby avoid entirely the need
for a court to choose between the needs of "competing ... sovereign
states."56 One possibility is merely to eliminate the word "sovereign"
from the issue. The problem of the true conflict then resolves itself to
the simple question of how to accommodate competing rules of deci-
sion whose policies are implicated by litigation involving private par-
ties. The vast majority of choice-of-law decisions, in other words, do
not implicate "sovereign" interests at all. Rather, each state has estab-
lished rules of decision to govern private ordering (contracts), and its
own version of cost-benefit analysis (torts). That Currie chose to
frame the issue as a choice to be made among the commands of com-
peting sovereigns, rather than among competing rules of decisions, is
a tribute to the powerful hold that traditional notions of territorialism
and sovereignty have in conflicts law.
Currie's legacy remains immense. Thirty years after his untimely
death, scholars still actively debate what he said and what he meant.
Professors as able and innovative as Lea Brilmayer, Larry Kramer,
Bruce Posnak, and Robert Sedler spend a great deal of time trying to
figure out what Currie really said and meant.5 7 I know of no other
scholars from Currie's era, with the remarkable exception of Hart and
Sacks,58 who exercise such enormous influence today.5 9 The influ-
55. See id. at 174 (stating that judicial "rules so evolved have not worked and cannot be
made to work"). Similarly, Currie referred not to "interests," but to "governmental inter-
ests." That phrasing makes the judge's task appear to be even more difficult.
56. There are other problems with Currie's formulation of the dilemma created by the
true conflict. The idea that significant staff work by experts is vital to work out the neces-
sary adjustments of competing laws seems somewhat odd today; our courts are quite confi-
dent (perhaps falsely) that they can handle very difficult policy issues, such as products
liability. Also out of place is the notion that legislatures, not courts, are the proper bodies
to make significant policy decisions. Both ideas were popular at the time Currie was writ-
ing, however. See, e.g., Julius Cohen, Hearing on a Bill: Legislative Folklore?, 37 MINN. L. REv.
34, 43 (1952) (advocating "a large, independent [committee] staff of competent
investigators").
57. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 49 (discussing Currie's governmental interest analy-
sis); Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL
Irr'L L.J. 245, 246 (1991) ("[T]he best way to get beyond Currie is to debate him one last
time in order to put his ideas in perspective."); Posnak, supra note 42; Robert A. Sedler,
Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics, '34
MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983) (defending Currie's governmental interest theory on conflict
of laws and responding to the critics of that theory).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76.
59. There is a vast amount of literature on Currie-inspired topics that would amaze a
student of other fields. One example involves the question of whether statutes have some
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ence, however, is almost solely in the academy; although judges often
mention Currie, they rarely follow his lead. The obvious question that
comes to mind is: Why not?
1. The Enfant Terribe.-Part of Currie's continued appeal must
lie in the fact that it was he who slew the Establishment dragon. To
the one-time Young Turks of conflicts law who were weaned on Cur-
rie's assault on Beale, the bonding must have been terrific. Many of
those Young Turks are still around (and in positions of importance)
to keep Currie's memory bright. Worshipping Brainerd's sacred writ-
ings has had profound consequences, but not always good ones. It
certainly has diverted the attention of many enormously talented
persons.
2. The Closed Conflicts World.-The world of conflicts scholars is
quite small; most of us know each other well. We attend the same
conferences and write about the same very small number of select
cases, even though hundreds of conflicts cases are decided every year.
That kind of incestuous environment encourages people to talk about
the same things. Currie is a usual topic because he left so many fasci-
nating and only half-answered questions.6" Who would not want to
talk about the proper solution of the "unprovided-for case," for exam-
ple? And the longer Currie dominates the discussion, the harder it is
not to talk about his work when writing in the field.
3. The Penalty.--Progress is stilled, however, whenever the focus
of debate is on sacred writings.61 This has proven particularly harmful
with Currie's writings, for the choice-of-law debate over the past thirty
form of "interest," when that interest is not expressed in the text of the law. See Larry
Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 292 n.41 (1990). That one or
more purposes-actual or constructive-animate statutory text has long been a staple
among students of statutory interpretation, and Currie's failure to recognize that fact can
only be described as incredible.
Another example involves Currie's fixation on a congressional solution to choice-of-
law problems. He argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause empowered Congress to
pass such legislation. See Currie, supra note 52, at 177. That issue is still debated, even
though it has been absolutely clear since well before Currie wrote that such legislative
power-clearly-was available to Congress under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (upholding congressional authority to regulate crop-
growing on very small farms).
60. A current hot topic, for example, is Larry Kramer's variation on Currie's discussion
ofJustice Traynor's opinion in Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953) (in bank). See
Kramer, supra note 57, at 269-71.
61. One of the leading conflicts casebooks for many years has been co-authored by
Currie's equally brilliant son David; a more recent co-author, Herma Hill Kay, co-authored
several articles with Brainerd Currie. The choice-of-law section of their casebook is virtu-
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years has largely been conducted on his terms (and using his terms).
This has been helpful in the case of false conflicts, but has been disas-
trous with true conflicts. Even today, academic writing largely has not
advanced conceptually beyond Currie's belief that courts simply
should not (or cannot, or both) resolve true conflicts. Scholars, in
other words, have accepted Currie's resolution of false conflicts. Un-
fortunately, their acceptance of his general view on the difficulty of
solving true conflicts ultimately has led them down a false trail-the
search for a relatively fixed and nondiscretionary method of resolving
true conflicts, a method in which no choice must be made between
the claim of competing sovereigns. 62 Beale's work may have been dis-
carded, but not his siren song of certainty.
D. The Second Restatement
Work on the Second Restatement began in the mid-1950s, and it was
largely completed by 1967.63 The work was not heavily influenced by
Currie's writings, in part because their impact on the conflicts world
really was felt only after the drafting of the Second Restatement was fairly
far along. The drafting, however, was strongly influenced by legal pro-
cess jurisprudence. To understand this, it is necessary to learn how
the Second Restatement works.
The Second Restatement combines a curious blend of presumptive
rules, reminiscent of those found in the First Restatement, and open-
ended policy analysis. It works this way: Each issue in a case must be
labeled-it must be called a "contracts" problem or a "torts" problem,
for example. 64 Assume the issue is styled a torts problem. Slightly
more than three dozen sections of the Second Restatement deal with spe-
cific tort situations;61 most identify a state whose law should be appliedon a particular issue, such as defamation.66 The law referred to by
ally a shrine to the work of the elder Currie. See ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF
LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1987).
62. See Currie, supra note 52, at 176-77.
63. On the history of the drafting of the Second Restatement, see generally Willis L.M.
Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 679 (1963).
64. The First Restatement of Professor Beale did not choose law based upon individual
problems; rather, it selected one law that would apply to the substantive aspects of the
whole case. This is sometimes called a jurisdiction-selecting system; the Second Restatement
uses a law-selecting system.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 145-185 (1971).
66. Section 150 of the Second Restatement states:
§ 150. Multistate Defamation
(1) The rights and liabilities that arise from defamatory matter in any one edi-
tion of a book or newspaper, or any one broadcast over radio or television, exhibi-
tion of a motion picture, or similar aggregate communication are determined by
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one of those sections, however, is only a presumptive choice; by viewing
the presumptively selected laws in light of the general principles
enunciated in section 6,67 and the common tort contacts set forth in
section 145,68 the lawyer or judge will determine whether the pre-
sumption has been rebutted.
At first blush, the Second Restatement looks like a curious cross be-
tween the vested rights theory and the legal process school. The re-
the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles
stated in § 6.
(2) When a natural person claims that he has been defamed by an aggregate
communication, the state of most significant relationship will usually be the state
where the person was domiciled at the time, if the matter complained of was
published in that state.
(3) When a corporation, or other legal person, claims that it has been defamed
by an aggregate communication, the state of most significant relationship will
usually be the state where the corporation, or other legal person, had its principal
place of business at the time, if the matter complained of was published in that
state.
Id. § 150.
67. Section 6 reads as follows:
§ 6. Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6.
68. Section 145 provides:
§ 145. The General Principle [in Tort Cases]
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
Id. § 145.
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semblance to the former, of course, lies in the presumptive law
choices;69 the rights may no longer be vested, but they do have to be
displaced. The resemblance to legal process may be harder to see.
Legal process jurisprudence is named, of course, for the famous mim-
eographed casebook released in 1958 by Professors Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks. 7' That magnificent work exalts the common law judge.
Its heroes are Lemuel Shaw and Benjamin Cardozo, and its exemplar
cases are Riggs v. Palmer1 and The TJ Hooper,72 all ground overt policy
analysis in individual cases with real facts, and all are ever alert to the
social contract in the form of reasonable expectations.
The touchstone of the judicial craft to Hart and Sacks is what they
styled "reasoned elaboration. "1 7' This requirement imposed a hard-
craft discipline on judicial decisionmaking. A legal process judge
must explain her decision; she must elaborate it by showing reasons why
society will be better off than it would be if the decision had gone
otherwise. 74 That explanation must be tied closely to the facts, and it
must reflect shared values. Those values, in turn, can be derived from
many sources: precedents, statutes, or deeply held societal beliefs.
Hart and Sacks even had a use for presumptions (although they did
not use that term); an example is their principle of "clear statement,"
which states that a federal statute should not be read to encroach on
areas generally subject only to state regulation unless it is clear that
Congress wanted that result.
75
Hart and Sacks loathed the first restatements. The didactic, rule-
bound, interlocking "scientific system" that characterized so many of
the first round of restatements was completely repugnant to them.76
They believed deeply that law without conscious selection and expla-
69. Professor Singer calls these provisions "faulty" and essentially "restatements of the
rules in the First Restatement." Singer, supra note 2, at 736.
70. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLCATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). I deliberately use the term "re-
leased." The book was not published until 1994, in an adaptation faithfully edited by Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, and published by Foundation Press. See HENRY
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). Further
references to Hart & Sacks will be to the 1994 casebook.
71. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
72. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
73. HART & SACKS, sUpra note 70, at 145-52.
74. See id. at 147.
75. Id. at 1209 (describing the policy of "clear statement" as a requirement on a legisla-
ture to say plainly the effect of its statute).
76. Their specific criticism of the first restatements can be found in HART & SACKS,
supra note 70, at 735-49. Their explicit criticism of all jurisprudence based on formalism,
including the first restatements, permeates their casebook.
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nation of policy should not be tolerated. Decisions must examine
how the policy that has been selected bears on the particular facts of
the case. Let the judge roam free to do justice, they wrote in essence;
demand only that the judge explain and that the judge reason.
The linkage between legal process and the Second Restatement now
should be much clearer.7" The philosophy animating sections 6 and
145 was to provide guidance for judges by reminding them of things
to consider in making a choice-of-law decision. The judge then would
weigh the factors in light of the facts and explain why she reached the
particular result. The listed factors certainly do not control the deci-
sion; rather, they merely suggest items upon which the judges should
reflect. In other words, the Second Restatement provides judges with a
starting point: a set of presumptions and a list of concerns worth ad-
dressing. It is then up to the judge to make it all work. Thejudge has
to choose which law to apply, not which theory. Indeed, theory has
relatively little to do with decisionmaking under the Second Restatement.
The scholars have savaged the Second Restatement. It is extremely
difficult to find a scholar who has anything good to say of it.78 Arthur
von Mehren's comment on the work is typical, although milder than
many: The Second Restatement, he wrote, "does not significantly refine
and discipline theory and analysis." 9 Scholars criticize the Second Re-
statement for its lack of a system and as the consequential invitation to
open-ended or indeterminate decisionmaking. Some of those criti-
cisms make good sense. Many of the presumptive selections, for ex-
ample, are out-dated,8" and it can be difficult to work among the
various techniques of decisionmaking. 8' More important, the work
does not explicitly encourage resort to policy analysis or to considera-
tion of what is the better rule of law.82 Although the framework of
77. The influence of legal process jurisprudence was at its zenith in the late 1950s. For
more on the history of legal process, see generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDI-
cIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 230-50, 292-316 (1976).
. 78. See Singer, supra note 2, at 736 (criticizing the presumptions and policy analysis of
the Second Restatement). But see Doug Rendleman, McMillan v. McMillan: Choice of Law in a
Sinkhole, 67 VA. L. REv. 315, 318 (1981) (endorsing the application of "the law of the juris-
diction having the greatest policy interest" in the litigation as the correct approach to con-
flict-of-laws questions).
79. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL
L. REv. 927, 964 (1975).
80. See Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (arguing that
many theories of conflicts have outlived their utility).
81. See BRILMAYER, supra note 49, § 2.2.3 (criticizing the "three levels of Restatement
norms" and the confusion generated in applying the appropriate "level" to the contested
issue).
82. See Singer, supra note 2, at 736 (criticizing the Second Restatement's "faulty" policy
analysis and avoidance of explicit considerations of the better law).
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sections 6 and 145 certainly provides room for a willing court to con-
sider the competing policy values, neither section really encourages it
to do so. Finally, the manner in which the Second Restatement actually
works is somewhat puzzling, especially to hard-pressed judges.83 Larry
Kramer, after reading all of the reported choice-of-law decisions
handed down in a recent year, wrote: "[I] t hardly comes as news that
the Second Restatement is flawed. But one needs to read a lot of
opinions in a single sitting fully to appreciate just how badly the Sec-
ond Restatement works in practice."84
Judges, on the other hand, adore the Second Restatement. It clearly
is the dominant choice-of-law methodology in use today in the court-
room.85 Judges love the work for the very reasons that scholars hate it:
The Second Restatement permits them to rely on its eminent authority;86
yet it is flexible, guides decisions rather than controls them, and per-
mits judges to avoid unjust results.87 At the same time, it avoids arbi-
trariness by requiring explanation.
A fundamental disagreement exists, therefore, over the wisdom
of the most widely used test for resolving choice-of-law issues. This
disparity between court and academy over the Second Restatement does
not seem to bother the professors. Clearly, we are right and the courts
are wrong; indeed, rare is the scholarly inquiry into why judges will-
ingly follow such a false scent. Judges, however, also do not seem
bothered by the "town versus gown" split; equally rare isjudicial recog-
nition of the criticism of the Second Restatement. I shall return to this
split in Part II, after bringing choice-of-law developments up-to-date.
E. Modern Commentators
The academic trade in Currie's revolution has been quite brisk.
The hottest currency by far has been the true conflict. No proposal
over how to resolve true conflicts has as yet dominated that field,
83. It is also puzzling to law students.
84. Kramer, supra note 4, at 486-87. One always wonders at the validity of a critique
based only on a sample of reported opinions. The success of a system depends in part on
how it handles the easy, as well as the difficult, cases. By their very nature, however, the
former will not be published, and, therefore, not evaluated by scholars.
A cynic might also wonder if academic hostility to the ubiquity of the Second Restatement
is based on pique at the judges having rejected the professors' pet theories.
85. See Borchers, supra note 3, at 373 (noting that twenty-four states purport to follow
the Second Restatement).
86. Eminent to other judges and practitioners, at least.
87. See Harold G. Maier, Finding the Trees in Spite of the Metaphorist: The Problem of State
Interests in Choice of Law, 56 A.B. L. REv. 753, 771 (1993) ("[The Second Restatement's] refusal
to espouse a universal set of pre-weighed interests may be the reason that [it] appears to
have claimed the majority of state adherents .... ").
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although the theories advanced certainly have been creative. Yet the
only two that have had any success in the courtroom are variations of
either Currie" or the Second Restatement.89 That lack of success cer-
tainly has not deterred entry into the field, however.
1. The Quest for Rules.-Professor Willis Reese, the Reporter for
the Second Restatement, wrote that the greatest question facing choice
of law was whether decisions should be made by "rules" instead of by
an "approach."9 ° This view, of course, represents a hankering still
shared by many for the apparent certainty and ease of decisionmaking
of the rules associated with the vested rights theory. There is no
shortage of proposed new rules-rules that, of course, would not suf-
fer from the flaws of the First Restatement. The first real example of this
revisionism came from the pen of Chief Judge Fuld of the Court of
Appeals of New York, a distinguished jurist who also sat as a member
of the Advisory Council to the drafting of the Second Restatement. In
1972, in Neumeier v. Keuhner," Fuld persuaded his court to agree to a
set of new rules drawn from that court's experience with guest statute
choice-of-law cases.9 2 Unfortunately, for all those who advocated the
adoption of new choice-of-law rules, however, Fuld's rules in Neumeier
88. This variation on Currie is called "comparative impairment." See William F. Baxter,
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. Rgv. 1 (1963). Baxter proposed a method
for resolving true conflicts which, to anyone but a conflicts scholar, looks like Currie's call
for a "restrained and enlightened" forum. Baxter's approach has been adopted in Califor-
nia, and needless to say, "comparative impairment" has spawned its own vast literature.
89. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 267 (1966). Leflar lists five "considerations" for courts to reflect upon in choice-of-law
cases. The first four "considerations" resemble section 6 of the Second Restatement. The last
consideration, however, has sparked enormous controversy, for Leflar suggested that
courts should also consider which state has the "better law." Id. at 275. Leflar's affinity for
the unstructured, legal process Second Restatement approach is natural enough, for he is a
legal process scholar himself, as well as a long-time teacher at judicial colleges. Leflar's
approach has been adopted in a handful of states. See Borchers, supra note 3, at 373 (not-
ing that five states purport to follow Leflar's choice-influencing considerations approach).
90. Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 315
(1972) [hereinafter Reese, Rules or Approach]. Professor Reese later made clear his prefer-
ence for rules in areas in which the common law had experimented enough to be sure of
the correctness of the rule (e.g., situs law should control transfers of interests in real prop-
erty), and that a more flexible "approach" should be used in areas in which a consensus
had not emerged. SeeWillis L.M. Reese, A Suggested Approach to Choice-of-Law, 14 VT. L. REv.
1, 3-4 (1989) [hereinafter Reese, A Suggested Approach] (stating a preference for choice-of-
law rules and their retention "until it is evident that harm that they create outweighs the
benefits that they promote").
91. 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
92. Fuld advocated the new rules because the otherwise applicable rules would fail to
"advance the relevant substantive law purposes" of New York. Id. at 458.
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were an immediate disaster, greeted with derision by judges93 and
scholars alike 9 4-even by those who favor rules. This rejection oc-
curred even though the Neumeier rules were expressly limited to the
specific and familiar area of guest statutes.95 This criticism, however,
has not diminished academic interest in writing a set of "good"
rules.96 As Professor Gary Simson observes, "if these are the kind of
rules that courts formulate when they are well-versed in a particular
area, there is much reason for trepidation when they formulate rules
in areas in which their background is relative meager."97
2. Territorialism.-One surprising development has been strong
advocacy based on geographic determinants.
a. Some Academic Exponents. -Attempts at counter-revolution
on behalf of the territorial theories embodied in the First Restatement
began not long after Currie started writing. A leading exponent of
the territorial theories was Professor David Cavers, who presented a
sophisticated combination of policy, party expectations, and territori-
alism.98 These new theories were based on the notion that individuals
have expectations based upon the territory in which certain actions
take place.99 These "Principles of Preference," as Cavers styled them,
resemble fairly closely the statements in sections 6 and 145 of the Sec-
93. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 205 (noting " ' free-wheeling Uudicial]
use' of the 'fundamental policy' loophole in order to reject choice-of-law clauses"); see also
Labree v. Major, 306 A.2d 808 (R.I. 1973). Labree, a case factually similar to Neumeier, was
decided only one year after Neumeier. Id. at 808; see also Chila v. Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207,
1209-10, 1211 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (distinguishing Neumeier, although bound by its rules,
to avoid achieving an absurd result).
94. For typical and recent comments, see GaryJ. Simson, The Neumeier-Schultz Rules:
How Logical a "Next Stage in the Evolution of Law" After Babcock?, 56 ALa. L. REv. 913, 926
(1993) ("[T]he Neumeier-Schultz rules are a failure."); Louise Weinberg, Mass Torts at the
Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis of the ALI's Proposed Choice Rule, 56 ALB. L. REV. 807, 843
(1993) (describing "the shallowness of thinking in the Neumeier rules").
95. Judge Fuld never explained why there should be rules for cases involving guest
statutes that might be different from rules that might be applied to cases involving other
kinds of torts; as every common lawyer knows, one cannot create rules for one specific area
of the law without explaining by reference to external standards why they are limited to
that area.
96. Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 281-84 (N.Y. 1993) (reaffirming the
validity of the Neumeier rules). For additional discussion of the Neumeier rules, see infra text
accompanying note 128.
97. Simson, supra note 94, at 927. According to Simson, the Neumeier rules do not even
achieve "consistency in decisionmaking." Id. at 916.
98. See DAVID F. CAvEas, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 139-45 (1965) (discussing prefer-
ence for laws of the state of injury and relating to expectations of the parties and other
policy issues).
99. See id. at 134-36.
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ond Restatement concerning policy objectives to be sought in choice-of-
law cases.' 0 0 To be sure, Cavers emphasized party expectations a good
bit more than did the drafters of the Second Restatement,'0 1 but there is
still a strong family resemblance. As a result, Cavers's work does not
go very far towards alleviating the problems perceived with the Second
Restatement.
Others have tried to create territorial solutions to choice-of-law
questions. Some have tried to confine judges by combining territori-
alism and rules. Professor Harold Korn, for example, has introduced
an elaborate system of rules based on the domicile of the parties.
10 2
As Professor Bruce Posnak has convincingly demonstrated, however,
Korn's quest for certainty and predictability with his rules is as chi-
meric as Beale's.' 3 Korn's scheme, for example, requires the court to
characterize the problem as a tort or contract, 0 4 a herculean task as
all critics of the First Restatement understand. Moreover, because
Korn's system-like Beale's-deliberately and completely ignores pol-
icy and the facts of individual cases, it can-and would, if adopted-
lead to absurd results.
b. The American Law Institute Rules.-Korn's method, how-
ever, has won an important adherent. The recently completed Com-
plex Litigation Project of the American Law Institute (ALI) also
employs a domicile-driven rule selection process. 10 5 Those rules, an
integral part of the ALI's recommendations concerning complex liti-
gation,1° 6 flatly reject the balancing approach of the Second Restate-
ment-promulgated by the same Institute only two decades earlier.
The ALI proposals have the advantage of kicking in only when
there is a true conflict. In other words, the proposed choice-of-law
rules are only used to resolve a situation in which policies of more
than one state would be furthered if its law were to be applied. Never-
theless, the failure to consider the facts and policies of the particular
case in the decisionmaking process means that the ALI rules necessar-
100. Compare id. at 114-38, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145
(1971).
101. See CAVERS, supra note 98, at 136.
102. See Harold Korn, The Choice of Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772,
960-70 (1983) (discussing the return to a "locus solution").
103. See Posnak, supra note 42, at 696-711.
104. See id. at 701 (describing Korn's treatment of conflicts relating only to torts).
105. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS
AND ANALYSIS § 6.01 (1994).
106. See id. at 398. The reporters of the project obviously felt compelled to address
choice of law; the need to do so, however, is questionable. See Sedler, supra note 57, at 597-
98.
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ily will be applied at some time in an arbitrary manner; they will be
applied in a manner that will serve no policy goal other than internal
consistency. That does not mean, of course, that the results always will
be wrong-after all, the proposals reflect what is likely to be the "cor-
rect" decision in the most likely cases. Nevertheless, in any particular
case, the result will be correct only fortuitously. 0 7
3. Substantive Rules.-Another possible solution is deliberately
to select a law that leads to a specified result. Many have tried this
route. 108 Professor Weintraub, for example, has urged that the law
favoring the plaintiff generally be applied. 109 Professor Kramer has
suggested that all contracts be held valid.110 Professor Weinberg has
argued that forum law should always be applied in the case of a true
conflict.11" ' The problems with those suggestions should be readily ap-
parent. Weintraub's policy is based on a trend in substantive law that
he believed favored plaintiffs; now that the tide in torts apparendy has
turned in favor of defendants, should his proposed solution also flip-
flop? Kramer's rule of validation, although generally useful enough,
ignores the many valid (and strongly held) policy reasons for why a
court will refuse to enforce some contracts (such as those containing
overly restrictive clauses restraining competition).2 Weinberg's lex
for rule would encourage forum shopping and increase the number
of perverse results that happen any time decisionmaking is separated
from policy." 3
107. For powerful academic criticism of the ALI rules, see Weinberg, supra note 94.
108. These proposals are related to the "True Rules" identified by Professor Ehrenzweig.
See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLIcrs IN A NUTSHELL 322-23 (2d ed. 1970). A True Rule
identifies a result that judges will generally strive to reach, no matter what the underlying
(and alleged) choice-of-law methodology. See id. at 323. Thus, judges will try to validate
contracts, legitimate children, and uphold marriages.
109. See RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAws 345-47 (3d ed.
1987) (favoring plaintiffs choice of law in tort cases).
110. See Kramer, supra note 59, at 331-34.
111. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 65-67 (1991).
112. See George F. Carpinello, Testing the Limits of Choice of Law Clauses: Franchise Con-
tracts As a Case Study, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 57, 80-83 (1990). Carpinello concludes: "Because
contract law itself contains an inherent conflict between the rights of the parties to choose
the terms and conditions of their relationship, and the need of the state to override those
wishes under certain circumstances, choice of law principles must also explicitly recognize
and accommodate that inherent conflict." Id. at 88.
113. I have chosen to illustrate modern choice-of-law commentary by referring to schol-
ars who attempt to limit the exercise ofjudicial discretion in choice-of-law cases. There are
writers who seek balancing solutions, but they appear to be in the minority. As the ALI
Rules show, the ball is definitely in the court of those who favor rules over reasoning.
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II. WHY THE TOwN VERSUS GowN SPLIT?
The choice-of-law triad of a conflicts course 1 4 is usually organ-
ized along the lines of the first part of this Article: It begins with the
First Restatement, then explores Currie, continues with the Second Re-
statement, and concludes with solutions proposed by contemporary
writers. Students immediately see the inadequacies of the Bealean sys-
tem, and they eagerly await the solution to the dilemma of reconciling
policy with predictability. Of course, they wait in vain. This eagerness
for a solution is quickly replaced by a hankering for a return to the
rules of the vested rights theory. Students understand that, although
those rules can be manipulated, at least they are rules; they produce,
therefore, apparent answers, unlike the endless classroom debates
over the modem theories; moreover, the students easily understand
the process of manipulation required by the Second Restatement
pigeonholes.
Some judges agree. Several courts in recent years have examined
modem developments and decided to stay with Professor Beale and
his system because they did not like the incoherence and result orien-
tation they saw in modem choice of law." 5 Others profess adherence
to Beale, but engage in systematic and unembarrassed use of the char-
acterization and public policy escape routes.
Most courts, however, have gone over to the Second Restatement." 6
Those courts also may not like indeterminacy very much, but the
methods available for achieving justice are much more comfortable
under the Second Restatement 17 and its demand only for reasoned elab-
oration, rather than the manipulation (and the deceit) required by its
predecessor.1 8 Moreover, the open-ended nature of the Second Re-
114. The other parts of the conflicts triad are jurisdiction (especially personal) and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
115. See supra text accompanying note 92; see also RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at
148 (explaining a "partial withdrawal" from Currie's approach in recent decisions as the
fear that "Currie's process has led ... to ad hoc decision-making").
116. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 148 ("Some combination of [Currie's
approach and the Second Restatement] has been adopted by most courts and commenta-
tors."); see also Borchers, supra note 3, at 357 (observing that thirty-six states have aban-
doned the First Restatement approach).
117. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (listing general
factors for determination of choice of law for each issue in a case), with id. § 377 (opting
for the law of the place of injury to apply to all substantive issues in the case).
118. Professor Borchers's excellent empirical analysis found that it does not matter what
methodology the courts espouse, because the actual-as opposed to theoretical-results
are the same under any post-Beale theory. "Courts," he writes, "do not take the new ap-
proaches seriously. . . . [NIone of them is much of a check on judicial discretion."
Borchers, supra note 3, at 379-80.
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statement permits courts to use all of conflicts scholarship to try and
understand what result to reach. Of course, academics routinely chas-
tise judges who combine more than one decisionmaking technique
(for example, Second Restatement and interest analysis), as though the
judges were students who had messed up on the final exam.119 The
academic quest seems to be doctrinal purity-that of the judges' sensi-
ble decisionmaking.
Why have courts rejected the work of highly respected scholars,
to the point of embracing a work condemned by the scholarly com-
munity? There are several answers. A couple go to the nature of con-
flicts scholarship; but there also are more important reasons derived
from the nature of the judicial process itself.
A. Academic Reasons
1. Turgid Witing.-Most articles on choice of law are very long
and difficult to read. Most scholars not only want to reinvent the
wheel, but to show why everyone else is wrong;120 consequently, they
feel the need to discuss all choice-of-law theories. There seems to be
an insatiable scholarly urge to use new vocabulary (or to redefine
old). Teutonic phrases like "loss-distributing regulation" dot many a
page.' 2  The articles usually, but not always, suffer heavily from schol-
arly honesty, the ability to see all sides of an argument-and to state
them at length. Their conclusions and recommendations cannot eas-
ily be summarized. Their application to a particular case is doubt-
ful.1 2 2 The Second Restatement, in contrast, is well written and short; it
is user friendly. No wonder judges prefer it.
Moreover, much of the academic writing is irrelevant. A vast
amount of current literature, for example, still focuses on old cases
involving guest statutes, a problem that has virtually disappeared from
the American legal marketplace. A comparatively small amount of
writing discusses topics such as statutory caps on recovery for malprac-
119. See id. at 368 (characterizing those states that combine approaches as
problematic").
120. Conflicts, of course, is not the only field in which academic writing is more focused
on what other academics are doing rather than what is happening in the real world. See,
e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32
WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 828 (1991) (observing that literature on statutory interpretation
is "prompted largely by the actions or analyses of other commentators").
121. See, e.g., Korn, supra note 102, at 945; see also PatrickJ. Borchers, The Return of Terri-
torialism to New York's Conflicts Law: Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 58 ALB. L. REv. 775,
781 (1995); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Status of Defrauded Securityholders in Corporate Bank-
ruptcy, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1, 62.
122. For a brilliant demonstration, see Singer, supra note 2 (eighty-eight detailed
pages).
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tice damages-an issue that judges might find relevant. Very little of
the literature is devoted to classical dissection and recasting by schol-
ars of what judges do in fact. 1 23
2. Academic Squabbles.-There is also the problem of which the-
ory to choose. There are so many theories, 124 and they are so often at
odds with one another. Scholars bitterly disagree over the results in
individual cases, and they are often unwilling even to admit that there
are cases about which reasonable persons could differ. How can a
court disentangle this information overload? Perhaps the best course
for a wise (and busy) judge to follow is to ignore these distractions.
The Second Restatement, in contrast, takes the judge to familiar terri-
tory. Its use of discrete policy and fact analysis encourages judges to
do that which they have been trained to do.
3. Fear of Failure.-Post-Bealean conflicts scholars are particu-
larly sensitive to the charge of incoherence. Even before the Critical
Legal Studies movement made most of us extremely sensitive to that
label, it had particular relevance for those writing about choice of law.
The attack on Beale and his First Restatement was based not so much on
theory (the silliness of applying law without inquiring into underlying
policy) as it was on the incoherence of the results: Bealean judges
were playing fast and loose with the rules laid down, and we scholars
were able to prove it. This discovery led to an avalanche of critical
writing attacking the purity of choice-of-law decisions.125 Effective
criticism on the basis of incoherence in results is relatively easy to pull
off, as even the Crits were able to demonstrate. Elaborating one's own
theory is far more difficult, in large part because the interesting
choice-of-law cases are really difficult. In other words, the results in
those cases are often indeterminate in the sense that they present no
easy answers, as the lack of consensus among the scholars discussing
those cases readily reveals. Anyone setting forth a theory of choice-of-
law decisionmaking, therefore, must worry about being subjected to
serious criticism. No wonder, then, that much of the focus of writing
on choice of law has been on attacking the work of others. Many of
123. See Russell J. Weintraub, An Approach to Choice of Law That Focuses on Consequences, 56
ALB. L. REV. 701, 714 (1993).
124. Today's dean of conflicts scholars, Professor Weintraub, writes: "[T]he commenta-
tors ... deforest the land with their mountains of conflicts articles .... Id.
125. See Maier, supra note 87, at 771 (rejecting the need for a universal theory apart
from policy considerations). But see Thomas M. Reavley & Jerome W. Wesevich, An Old
Rule for New Reasons: Place of Injury As a Federal Solution to Choice of Law in Single-Accident
Mass-Tort Cases, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1, 43 (1992) (noting "the death of scholarly attention to
discretionless standards").
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these critics are brilliant and their criticisms telling; yet a surprising
number of authors are unwilling to put their necks on the chopping
block with positive theories of their own. Far better to take pot shots
at a target that cannot respond easily than to stick out one's own
neck.1 26 Many scholars, as a result, are destructive only-they have
nothing positive to add to the debate. This has led to resentment re-
cently, and it has also led to scholarly irrelevance. Judges are not in-
terested in what is wrong, but rather in what works.
4. Trendy Post-Modernism.-This search for a set of rules that
would lead to decisionmaking without discretion mirrors the recent
resurgence of academic interest in formalism. 127 In this, at least, con-
flicts scholars were clearly ahead of the curve, for our interest in iden-
tifying and following rules in the post-realist period can be traced
back to 1972 and Judge Fuld's decision in Neumeier v. Keuhner.128 Be-
cause judges distrust rules, however, this trend does not help the judi-
cial reception of choice-of-law scholarship.
Indeed, the search for choice-of-law theory itself has proved de-
structive. To quote Professor Reese again: "One of the amazing
things about choice of law, both in the past and in the present, is the
tendency to resort in all situations to one all-embracing theory.' 2 9
One is reminded of the search for a philosopher's stone in medieval
alchemy, or the unified field theory in modern physics. The problem,
of course, is that law is not science. As Holmes, the legal equivalent of
Einstein, wrote: "The life of the law has not been logic, it has been
experience." 1
30
B. Judicial Process Reasons
The most important explanations for judicial reliance on the Sec-
ond Restatement involve the nature of the judicial process. Caseload
126. See Posnak, supra note 42, at 689 n.52 ("This writer has already lost one head from a
self-inflicted wound .. ").
127. See, e.g., PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW (1987). In their preface, Atiyah and Summers state:
[This book's] principal focus is on what we believe to be major differences ...
between . . . 'formal' and 'substantive' [legal reasoning] .... In the process of
identifying and explaining these differences, we have found it necessary to con-
struct a fairly elaborate theoretical apparatus about 'formality' as an attribute or
property of legal systems, and we hope that this itself constitutes an original con-
tribution to legal theory.
Id. at v.
128. 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972); see supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
129. Reese, A Suggested Approach, supra note 90, at 9.
130. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
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pressure makes it more difficult for judges to develop or work with
theory. Even more telling is the extreme reluctance of judges to fol-
low rules that do not lead to justice.
1. Caseload Pressures.--Choice of law, at its best, presents judges
with difficult decisions. Many courts see only one or two serious
choice-of-law cases every year. It is hard for the judges, therefore, to
develop expertise in the field. Because an aura of mystery and magic
surrounds choice of law, the judges feel uncomfortable doing what
otherwise would come naturally-engaging in simple policy analysis
based on the facts of the case. Thus, they turn to the academic ex-
perts, but the welter and density of available advice only bewilders
them further.131 Their law clerks are of no help, either; the clerks,
after all, also have been mystified by the academic doctrine. In those
circumstances, the clear language of the Second Restatement, with its
basic invitation to openness in decisionmaking, naturally pleases those
who actually must make the decisions. Unfortunately, the literature
(and probably the judges' clerks as well) have convinced the judges
that it cannot be that easy. Hence, all of the bland and unhelpful
references in the opinions to Currie and other scholars that draw such
derision from academic commentators. Professor Weintraub wrote
recently and wisely: "Alas, there is no magic powder, no rule, no the-
ory, that will guarantee that every judicial opinion will be a model of
clear analysis. Judges are not dumb, just busy, and it is not fair to
criticize their opinions without being mindful of that reality."1 "2
2. Rules and Common Law Judges.-The common law abhors
rules. This observation is universally true. In contract law, for exam-
ple, the basic notion of consideration could not possibly be thought of
as a "rule"; it is more properly conceived of as a myth or perhaps as a
goal. 133 Other contract principles that might be styled "rules" are also
balanced by the estoppel principle, 3 or by the use of well-known,
contract-style, escape devices.135
131. To put it more succinctly: scholars ponder hypos; judges decide cases.
132. Weintraub, supra note 123, at 704.
133. Consider the use of the doctrines of "promissory estoppel," "third party benefici-
ary," or "modification" to leaven the harshness of consideration; at the other end of the
spectrum, the gift-promise distinction can be used to manipulate the question of whether
any contract ever has been formed.
134. Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts permits estoppel to override the statute of
frauds when there has been reasonable reliance by the promisee. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1979).
135. Although the hornbook rule is that one must literally comply with contract condi-
tions, the law has provided a number of escape routes for judge and litigants. These in-
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Negligence, the basic doctrine in torts, can hardly be called a
rule; indeed, the great leavener of the negligence doctrine is the jury
system, the most antirule factor in all of our law. Thus, the question
in most tort cases is not whether there was negligence, but rather
whether a reasonable juror could have found that the defendant had
acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Similar examples can be found throughout all of the common
law. Statutory law also is subject to the same relaxation of apparently
rigorous rules. Basic notions of fairness are commonly tacked onto
the plain language of statutes. Maxims abound for use by the creative
judge; perhaps the most common asserts that statutes should be read
in the light of common law principles.136 Thus, courts routinely ig-
nore the clear linguistic command of statutes of descent and distribu-
tion in order to prevent a murderer from profiting by his own
wrong.137
The truth of the matter is that judges bitterly resist being bound
by "rules" that prevent them from reaching sensible results. Hart and
Sacks and the legal process school really did get it right: The com-
mon law is built upon notions of judicial elaboration of well-known
principles in light of specific facts. 38 Legal formalism is dead and
buried, and that battle need not be fought again-except, it seems, in
choice of law.
The common law's refusal to use a rule-based theoretical system
of judging stems from two sources. First, any theoretical system, such
as the vested rights theory, instructs judges to ignore both policies and
the facts of the individual cases. That demand is so antithetical to all
modern legal training that it is almost impossible to conceive of a rule
system successfully being imposed upon today's judiciary.1 39 More-
clude the doctrines of waiver and substantial performance, and the notion that "the law
abhors a forfeiture." The application of these notions to any discrete set of facts is prob-
lematic. This was also true, of course, with the escape devices from the similarly rigid rules
of the First Restatement.
136. See WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, JUDICLAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 242-43 (2d ed. 1991).
137. The leading case is Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). In Riggs, the court
conjectured that the drafters of the descent statutes would not have intended that a son
who murdered his father to make the decedent's will operative would benefit under the
will. Id. at 189 ("[A] thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless it be within the intention of the makers.").
138. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
139. This realistic observation has not prevented the development of a vast literature on
the subject. For a discussion of the debate between rules and standards in the constitu-
tional context, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARv. L. REv. 22 (1992); see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 DUKE LJ. 557 (1992).
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over, a rule-based system makes it much more difficult for judges to
achieve the sensible result in individual cases. By "the sensible result,"
I do not necessarily mean what is often referred to as a "result-ori-
ented" decision; I mean simply thatjudges try hard to reach decisions
that make sense given the relevant facts and policies. The result has
to sound right in the heart as well as in the brain. The American legal
system, in other words, believes in much more than predictability; it
also believes in reaching the right decision. Thus, predictability, as a
raw tool, will generally lose out to sensibleness.
That victory may be costly, however. Judges may like to do justice,
but they also like to pay obeisance to the "rules laid down." Thus,
there will be ritual references to the stated law, but the real decisions
will be made out of sight. The effect, of course, can be quite harmful.
Justice, unlike politics and sausage-making, should never be done in
the dark. Making the decisionmaking public (in the form of a rea-
soned opinion) helps ensure even treatment of litigants and provides
proper guidance to those judges and lawyers who must use the deci-
sions in the future.
This simple truth about the extreme reluctance of our legal sys-
tem to follow rules has enormous implications for solving our choice-
of-law dilemma. If what I have written is accurate, any attempt to im-
pose a rule-based solution is doomed to failure. Worse, the need to
manipulate doctrine covertly to achieve justice will lead to uneven
decisionmaking and obscure the development of the law. This, of
course, was exactly the experience with the rules of the First Restate-
ment and escape devices.
III. CUTTING THE GoRDLIAN KNOT
By now my proposed solution to choice-of-law issues should be
obvious. Before revealing nirvana in detail, however, I shall discuss
several other possible solutions to the choice-of-law problem. First,
those that will not work.
A. Utopian Proposals
1. Abolish the States.-The dilemma would resolve itself, at least
for interstate matters, if there were no states. This solution has the
elegance of Occam's razor, but it also has the political feasibility of
eliminating television in order to improve the reading scores of chil-
dren. And given the last couple decades' experience with government
from Washington, we may not even want this to happen.
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2. Federal Choice of Law.-There can be no doubt that Congress
possesses legislative authority 4 ° to create federal statutory choice-of-
law solutions.' The federal government, however, does not seem
likely to bestir itself in this area.'4 2 Moreover, statutory solutions al-
most always take the form of territorially based rules.' 4 3 That is under-
standable; legislators like to think (if that is the right word) in terms
of specific problems. Any territorial choice-of-law solution, of course,
necessarily raises questions of exalting predictability, assuming that
ever can be achieved, over policy development and proper factual res-
olution.'4 4 The ALI Complex Litigation Project provides an apt exam-
ple. "'4 5 Although territorial resolutions no doubt work in some
circumstances in which a definite solution enhances efficiency and
can be achieved without policy cost, examples are quite limited.' 4 6
For those of us who prefer flexible, fact-based law, however, territorial,
and, therefore, statutory, solutions should be avoided.
3. Limiting the Sweep of Judicial and Legislative Jurisdiction. -The
problems of choice of law would diminish considerably if the Supreme
Court were to cut back significantly on the scope of personal and leg-
islative jurisdiction. If this were done, the number of choices that
would need to be made necessarily would diminish. The world would
become a simpler, if not necessarily better, place. Many commenta-
140. The constitutionality of judicially created solutions is discussed ably and at length
in Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Founda-
tion of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1992). Because the Supreme Court has re-
quired federal courts sitting in diversity to apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum, see
Klaxon Co. v. Stentnor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), it is difficult to imagine
the Court's authorizing judicially created choice-of-law solutions.
141. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution provides ample authority for congres-
sional action, although Brainerd Currie and others have spent an inordinate amount of
time arguing about whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause also provides Congress with
the authority. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 140, at 289 (discussing the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and choice-of-laws decisions). In any event, Congress certainly could adopt solu-
tions to interstate (or international) choice-of-law problems if it wished.
142. There has been periodic movement in a few areas, especially products liability, but
adoption seems unlikely. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion
over Competing Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REv. LmNG. 273, 291 (1991) (discussing pro-
posed reforms involving "mass tort" situations). There are other side effects, of course, to a
federal choice-of-law solution. See id. at 293. Plaintiffs' autonomy would be reduced, for
example. Id. The desirability vel non of these effects is beyond the scope of this Article.
143. The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is a prime example.
144. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing predictability and policy
development in a rules-based system).
145. See Brunet, supra note 142, at 292.
146. Workable territorial solutions are exemplified by document location statutes such
as U.C.C. § 9-313 (1994). In those instances, both the difficulty of judicial manipulation
and the economic value of certainty justify a hard-and-fast rule.
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tors favor this solution. 14 7 This hope does not seem likely to be real-
ized, however; indeed, the most recent decisions by the Court have
done nothing to diminish the scope of either judicial or legislative
jurisdiction.' 48 It is unlikely, therefore, that the Supreme Court will
provide the necessary restraint.
4. Forum Non Conveniens.-Almost all states, as well as the fed-
eral courts, have adopted broad standards of dismissal for reasons of
forum non conveniens.' 49 Eminent authorities have suggested that
the popularity of forum non conveniens is due in part to the very
broad authorization of long-arm jurisdiction and legislative jurisdic-
tion by the Supreme Court in the past fifty years. 150 Forum non con-
veniens, in other words, could be an effective antidote to broad
choice-of-law possibilities. Unfortunately, even if that were true, the
use of forum non conveniens is merely a back-door way of handling
the problem. If our choice-of-law system leads to bad decisions, those
problems should be addressed directly rather than through the use of
subsidiary doctrines such as forum non conveniens. Courts should ad-
dress the real problem rather than its side effects.
5. Legislative Uniformity.--Congress could preempt entire sub-
stantive fields, such as products liability, leaving no choice to be made
between conflicting laws."' Similarly, the states could adopt uniform
laws dealing with particular problems.
Once again, experience teaches that neither solution is likely to
work pervasively. A recent federal attempt to adopt substantive prod-
ucts liability laws has proven fruitless, due largely to the lobbying ef-
forts of the American Trial Lawyers Association.152 The impact of
147. See generally Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1991 (1991)
(arguing that the Supreme Court would have an easier time in choice-of-law cases if it were
not as concerned with questions of litigant equality and substantive-procedure distinctions
when establishing the scope of federal jurisdiction).
148. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 622 (1990) (upholding personal
jurisdiction achieved through in-state service on a nondomiciliary).
149. See, e.g., Fox v. Board of Supervisors, 576 So. 2d 978, 990 (La. 1991) (arguing that
article 123 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Louisiana provides authority to dismiss a suit
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens).
150. See William L. Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non Con-
veniens and Counter Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1663, 1664-65 (1992)
(stating that the popularity of forum non conveniens has widespread acceptance).
151. On the recent tendency of federal statutory law to preempt state tort law, see S.
Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 685, 687
(1991) (noting that "there is hardly a political question that is not sooner or later turned
into a federal preemption question for the judiciary").
152. See For the Record, WASH. PosT, May 16, 1996, at M5.
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uniform laws in choice of law has been dubious; when courts do not
like the rules laid down, they will cheat the mandate of a uniform law
in order to reach a just result 153 as readily as they will cheat judge-
made rules.
B. The Common Law Solution to Choice-of-Law Problems: The Legal
Process Rule
So what will work? A good first step is to learn from the lessons of
mistakes past. From Story we learned that a focus on comity-apply-
ing the law of another state as an act of grace-will not work. 54 From
Beale and the First Restatement we learned that judges will not obey
rigid rules and the futility of a search for a unified theory of choice of
law.' 55 From Currie we learned not to focus on "governmental" inter-
ests and hand-wringing over difficult problems. 56 From the Second
Restatement we learned that judges should be encouraged to focus on
policies, and that all solutions, even "presumptions," need to be up-
dated and treated lightly.5 7 Finally, academic squabbling has taught
us that the fine print is not as important as the outline.
Imagine a bright attorney schooled in the common law whose
mind is a tabula rosa when it comes to choice of law. Imagine further
that she has been presented with what we would identify as a potential
choice-of-law problem. How would our counselor approach it? I am
confident that she would find the task easy and would apply what
might be called the "legal process rule." A dispute with multistate dimen-
sions should not be treated differently than a case located solely in one state.
The competing rules of decision (whether from different sovereigns or not)
should be isolated, and the policies that animate them should be identified. If
those policies do not conflict, there is no problem. If they do conflict, then the
case should be resolved in the same way that a purely domestic matter would be
resolved. There would be no talk of "sovereignty" or of "comity" or of
"vested rights." 5 ' Rather, in this legal process world, the sole concern
153. See Anne Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical Reexamination of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 845, 848, 859 (1992) (discussing failure of the Act to reach uniform results and
noting that courts ignore the Act's mandate in order to achieve desirable results).
154. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
158. Cf Maier, supra note 87, at 759 (making a similar argument with the addition that
judges should consider "systemic" interests).
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would be with application of identified policy in light of the facts of
the case. 1
59
Eliminating consideration of choice-of-law theory will focus judi-
cial attention on the real issues involved in almost all choice-of-law
cases-policy analysis and fact development. That is the way our
judges are accustomed to think and act; it is the failure to follow in-
stinct and training that causes most of the perceived problems in
choice-of-law decisionmaking today. In other words, judges do best
when they focus on the facts at hand; trouble arises when they believe
that they must also think about such issues as sovereignty. It is those
beliefs that have contributed significantly to the sub-standard quality
of choice-of-law decisions.
This method of approaching choice-of-law problems also com-
ports with the role of the fifty states in our federal scheme. That is not
to suggest that my proposal is compelled by the Constitution. The ori-
gins of the Full Faith and Credit Clause are too obscure and lost in
history to warrant such a sweeping mandate. 6 ° On the other hand, it
seems that we have reached a point in our history as a nation where it
no longer makes sense to think of the decision to apply the law of
another state as an act of grace. Comity may well be proper in the
international sphere, but it has no place in our federal system.
Perhaps this has not always been true. After all, within the mem-
ory of many millions of us alive today, state laws segregated public
schools and forbade marriage between whites and blacks. Today,
however, the Supreme Court's imposition of equal protection, due
process, and other constitutional limits on the ability of the states to
act unfairly is relatively complete. How then can the highest court of
a state refuse to apply an otherwise applicable rule of decision of an-
other state on the ground that the rule violates the forum's "public
policy"? "Comity" should not be a matter of grace, as Story had it;16 1
rather, comity should be universal, and, therefore, not worth
mentioning.' 6
2
159. See Kramer, supra note 59, at 296 (discussing how to identify whether a law has a
multistate dimension). As Kramer points out (in good legal process manner), this merely
"depends on the purpose of the law in question." Id.
160. But see Laycock, supra note 140, at 250 (arguing that choice-of-law questions are
controlled by the Constitution because they deal with the allocation of governmental
authority).
161. See supra text accompanying note 21.
162. It will be hard to abandon the notion that one state applies another state's law only
as an act of grace. This concept has betrayed Currie and many others; there seems to be
something about "sovereignty" that causes otherwise reasonable scholars to jettison com-
mon sense in favor of theory. How else can one explain Currie's argument that the resolu-
tion of a true conflict requires political skills of the highest order, skills that courts, by
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A focus on the application of competing rules of decision16 that
happen to arise in different states does not necessarily mean that terri-
torial concerns will not be present in choice-of-law decision-making.
The expectations of the parties, of course, may be based on where
they live or work. Once those expectations have been identified, the
judge will have to accommodate the laws competing for supremacy
with those expectations. That can be an extraordinarily difficult task,
but it should not be made more difficult merely because an interstate
case presents the problem. Nor should it be made more difficult by
choosing, as did the ALI Complex Litigation Project, a rigid, yet elu-
sive, concept such as domicile to serve as a surrogate for expecta-
tions.16 4 Expectations can arise in many different ways, and the court
should be free to explore the full range of possibilities.
No doubt there will be some tendency to favor forum law. After
all, when opposing doctrines do come into conflict, it will be natural
enough for the court to favor those doctrines that it helped develop.
But there will be less tendency to favor forum law if considerations
requiring the formal consideration of sovereign interests of the
judge's own state are not involved in the process. After all, it must be
emotionally difficult to subordinate your own state's "sovereign inter-
ests" to those of another; it should be far easier to defer to a compet-
ing policy that just happens to have been articulated by another
sovereign. Moreover, keeping the court on the familiar policy-and-
fact track will inevitably improve the quality of decisionmaking simply
because that method is familiar.
Finally, some (probably many) will object to the legal process rule
because it apparently enhances judicial discretion and reduces pre-
dictability. 165 One answer is that recent years have seen a strong trend
in favor of discretion in procedural areas.' 66 A better answer, of
course, is that experience has taught us that rules really do not cabin
definition, lack? See BRANERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 182
(1963).
163. Professor Maier refers to unfortunate metaphors in the field, such as "conflicts" or
governmental interests," as suggesting choice-of-law decisionmaking is a "zero-sum game."
Maier, supra note 87, at 754.
164. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 105, § 6.01.
165. Cf Brunet, supra note 142, at 277 (asking whether "the rising degree of discretion
needed to manage modern complex litigation [is] altogether desirable").
166. This trend is exemplified by the term "managerial justice." See Judith Resnick,
Managerial Justice, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982) (discussing the movement among fed-
eral judges who are increasingly dropping "disinterested prose" and adopting a more dis-
cretionary "managerial" stance). It is ironic that the ALl Complex Litigation Project
generally favors (strongly) judicial discretion, but rejects the idea in choice of law. See
Brunet, supra note 142, at 298.
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discretion; they merely hide its exercise. An even better answer (and
the one that Hart and Sacks would approve) is that the requirement
of reasoned elaboration of opinions itself significantly limits judicial
discretion and produces the only real predictability possible in a falli-
ble, multi-variate world. In any event, it is better that the exercise of
discretion be explored openly in the decisionmaking process than
that it be hidden, as is the case when theory does not lead to justice.
1. Exceptions.-The legal process rule should not apply automat-
ically in three relatively rare situations: (1) when the problem involves
the possible application of the law of a foreign nation; (2) when the
forum legislature has expressly compelled a result; or (3) when the
true sovereign interests of a state are directly implicated.
a. Foreign Nations.-The legal process rule should generally
be used even when the law of foreign nations might be applied. This
rule cannot be absolute, however, because the law of the foreign na-
tion might be "unconstitutional"-in the sense that it is despotic, bar-
baric, discriminatory, or worse. The system always must have an
escape valve to avoid those results; the escape valve is not needed
purely for domestic litigation, of course, because the Supreme Court
ensures (we hope) that no American laws are despotic.'6 7
b. A Compelled Result.-Some state legislation expressly com-
pels the application of a particular law.' 6 ' If the compulsion comes
from the legislature of the forum state, then, under normal principles
of separation of powers (that is, legislative supremacy), that result
must be followed.
c. True Sovereign Interests.--A few cases actually implicate the
sovereign interests of a government. There are, for example, some
cases in which the government qua government has a direct stake in
the litigation. In these cases, the forum has been asked to impinge on
another state's sovereign rights. An example is Nevada v. Hall..69
167. See Laycock, supra note 140, at 259-60 (making a somewhat similar argument that
domestic and international choice-of-law problems should be treated differently).
168. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8121 (1975) (prescribing the lex loci delicti rule
regarding statute of limitations). Because it is doubtful that legislatures often consider
problems of extraterritoriality, a court should be very careful in this area. Nevertheless,
statutes rarely contain express choice-of-law provisions, and it is unlikely that the legislature
very often has any implied "intent" with respect to their relationship to choice of law. That
leaves purpose (in the sense of goals, objectively defined) as the source of statutory mean-
ing in choice-of-law cases.
169. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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That case involved an accident in California between a car driven by
an employee of the University of Nevada and a California resident.17 0
Nevada limited its liability in those circumstances to $25,000; Califor-
nia, however, did not recognize the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity.171 The jury, after finding the Nevada driver negligent, awarded
$1,150,000 in damages. 172 The Supreme Court upheld the award. 173
The case clearly involved the direct financial interest of the State of
Nevada and, therefore, posed the stark question of whether California
could override the sovereign interest of Nevada. 174 The Supreme
Court said that it could. 175 Such cases are not susceptible to the analy-
sis suggested here. These are rare cases, however, and they usually
can be identified easily and treated in some other fashion. Their
proper resolution is not essential to this Article.
IV. SOME ExAMPLEs
An article on how to decide cases should provide examples. Here
are two:
Lilienthal v. Kaufman'76 is the older example. The facts are sim-
ple. The plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract in Cali-
fornia. 177 The defendant refused to perform, and suit was brought
against him in his home state, Oregon.'78 The only defense was that
the defendant had been declared a spendthrift under Oregon law.' 79
This should have been an easy case. The first step obviously is to con-
strue the Oregon spendthrift statute. Does a fair construction of that
statute compel a result in favor of the spendthrift? If so, then an Ore-
gon court must follow the command of its legislature. If not, then the
court must resolve the issue as one for its own development of statu-
tory and common law principles. 80 Expressed quite differently, the
court must resolve a conflict between the plaintiff's legitimate expec-
170. Id. at 411.
171. Id. at 412.
172. Id. at 413.
173. Id. at 427.
174. See id. at 426 (arguing that respect for Nevada's sovereignty does not oblige the
Court to override California's policy for compensation to accident victims).
175. Id. at 427.
176. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
177. Id. at 543.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. It is irrelevant for present purposes whether this second step is viewed as statutory
construction or the making of common law. For an excellent demonstration that there
really is no difference between the two, see Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw.
U. L. REV. 805, 807 (1989).
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tations that courts will enforce promises supported by consideration
and the Oregon policy of protecting spendthrifts from their own folly.
To answer that question, the court would have to consider
whether the plaintiff's expectations were legitimate: Had the plaintiff
made a proper credit check on the defendant in both California and
Oregon? If he had,"'1 then the court should ask whether the purpose
of Oregon's protective policy overrode the more fundamental social
policy of enforcing contracts. The answer to that question might re-
quire the court to make difficult decisions. They are not difficult,
however, in any theoretical sense. Indeed, one can say that this kind
of case is routine grist for the judicial mill.
The later example is Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.182 Schultz
also should have been an easy case; unfortunately, the court's fascina-
tion with conflicts methodology, as well as the sorry history of the New
York courts in choice of law,"83 led to a bad decision. The facts of
Schultz are horrible. The plaintiffs were parents of two boys who, while
on a scouting trip in New York State, were molested by their Scoutmas-
ter, a Franciscan Brother, who was also their classroom teacher.
18 4
The parents sued both the Boy Scouts and the Franciscan Brothers;
the former was domiciled in NewJersey at the time of molestation, but
had later moved to Texas. NewJersey was also the plaintiffs' domicile.
The Franciscan Brothers were domiciled in Ohio. The issue up for
resolution was charitable immunity. Of those four states, only New
Jersey recognized charitable immunity.
1 85
The decision should have been relatively straightforward. A child
had been molested in the state of New York, a clear and significant
violation of both the criminal and civil laws of that state. It would be
difficult, indeed, for a person not schooled in conflicts law to devise a
rationale for applying the law that would permit the molester to es-
cape liability, but that is just what the court did."8 6 Perhaps bemused
by its own bad record in choice-of-law cases,187 or by its fascination
with developing the purported interests of the various jurisdictions,
181. There is some evidence to the contrary. See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 61, at 253.
182. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
183. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
184. Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 681.
185. Id. at 682. Ohio recognizes some form of limited charitable immunity, but the
Franciscan Brothers did not contend that Ohio law applied. Id.
186. Id. at 689.
187. The Court of Appeals of New York was notorious for its early decisions in choice-of-
law cases involving guest statutes, a pattern of decisions that led one commentator to as-
sert: "A NewYork lawyer with a guest statute case has more need of an ouija board ... than
a copy of Shephard's citations." Maurice Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 459, 460 (1967).
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the court, quite amazingly, was able to conclude that "New York's de-
terrent interest is considerably less [than the New Jersey interest] be-
cause none of the parties is a resident and the rule in conflict is loss-
allocating rather than conduct-regulating. '" 18 8
The court is stating that New York does not have a strong interest
in deterring child molestation within its borders simply because none
of the parties is a resident. That cannot be correct. Surely, New York
has a strong interest in dealing with serious criminal conduct occur-
ring within its borders.8 9 Indeed, as Professor Weinberg has pointed
out, it certainly would be a flagrant violation of the Constitution for
New York police to devote less effort to preventing child molestation
when either the child or the molester was from another state. °90 The
court only compounded its error by comparing the New York interest
with that of New Jersey, the only state with charitable immunity.' 9 ' It
is almost impossible to conceive of what policy would be furthered if
the New Jersey immunity rule were to be applied in a situation in
which the conduct occurs elsewhere, and the charity seeking protec-
tion is no longer located in NewJersey.' 92 The court merely states-
rather lamely-that applying the law of the common domicile of the
parties will reduce forum shopping, reduce bias in favor of the forum,
enhance reciprocity, and finally produce a rule that is easy to apply 1 93
None of those institutional reasons compels the perverse re-
sult.1 94 To take them in reverse order, ease of application is hardly
the major goal of our legal system; otherwise, the content of this law
would be far different. Again, reciprocity is a fine goal to seek, but it
does not lead to any particular result; one might as well ask why New
Jersey would not apply New York law in order to further reciprocity.
Finally, forum shopping and forum bias may exist no matter what the
court does; at least, the court can try and combat charges of forum
bias by explaining its decisions with reasons that explain something,
and the elimination of forum shopping is not the sole end of the law.
Even if combatting forum bias were an important goal, the New York
court has assumed that its rule must give way to that of NewJersey-a
188. Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 686.
189. Id. at 690 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
190. See Weinberg, supra note 111, at 89.
191. See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 690 (Jasen,J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority could
have taken a more balanced approach, instead of understating or overlooking the signifi-
cance of New York's interests).
192. Id.
193. Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687.
194. See Simson, supra note 94, at 916-19 (criticizing Schultz in the context of the recent
quest for rules).
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conclusion that has hardly been demonstrated properly to balance the
interests involved.
1 95
CONCLUSION
Choice of law needs to shed its past. The decision to apply one
law over another should not be thought of as an arcane mystery, some-
thing that can only be attempted by the High Priests of the Temple
Currie; nor should choice-of-law problems be treated as delicate polit-
ical problems requiring the wisdom of Kissinger or the younger Pitt.
The question of law application presents no difficult conceptual prob-
lem: The court identifies relevant policies and decides which should
control on the facts before it. Grand theory is not needed, although
common sense is.
The siren song of rules should be avoided. The history of choice
of law surely teaches that efforts to hobble judges with preordained
results is doomed to failure and that the resulting harm will be magni-
fied by the hidden nature of escape devices. 196 Judges, rather, should
be encouraged to explain why their search for truth leads them to a
result. At least then the focus will be on why. Better decisionmaking
can only be the result.197
195. Even fans of the Neumeier rules find Schultz hard to swallow. See, e.g., Peter Hay &
Robert B. Ellis, Bridging the Gap Between Rules and Approaches in Tort Choice of Law in the
United States: A Survey of Current Case Law, 27 INT'L LAw. 369, 382-83 (1993) (arguing that
applying the Neumeier rules directly is better than applying the Schultz distinction, which is
more trouble than it is worth").
196. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
197. See Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statu-
tory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2505, 2595 (1992) ("Postmodernism may not tell us
how to construe statutes, but it very definitely tells us how not to interpret them: That is,
one should not employ a foundational theory or a transcendent methodology of interpre-
tation if one adheres to postmodern tenets." (footnote omitted)).
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